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Barring Fear: 
Philo and the Hermeneutic Project 
 
 
(Figure 1. A lunette mid 12th century Chiesa di San Giusto in Volterra) 
 
 Throughout his works Philo continued to draw a distinction between 
the literal and the symbolic: the symbolic opening the way to the 
allegorical.1 Operative within his writings is a set of distinctions that work 
to displace the assumed centrality of the literal, the latter understood as 
the giveness of text and thus the mere giveness of the world of the senses. 
The act of displacement is itself far from abstract. The continuity of the 
move from the literal occurs both within and as the practice of 
interpretation. As such, it defines a certain version of the hermeneutic. The 
literal is that from which there is a continuity of migration. However, 
interpretations were no mere scholastic concerns. Interpretation for Philo is 
not just commentary. The contention here is that not only cannot be 
separated from the ethical, the connection opens up a possible 
transformative effect on the nature of the ethical. As a beginning the link to 
the ethical is clear from Philo’s own discussion of Abraham’s ‘migrations’. 
Of the latter he writes the following in On Abraham: 
 The migrations as set forth by the literal text of the scriptures are 
made by a  man of wisdom (ανδρός σοφοϋ) but according to the laws of 
allegory (κατά  δέ τους έν αλληγορία νόμους) by a virtue loving soul in 
its search for the  true God (υπό φιλαρέτου φυχής τον αληθή ζητούσης 
θεό).2 
The project of this paper involves two interconnected elements. The first 
element involves tracing the way the ethical and the hermeneutic are linked. 
The second element involves indicating the ways that, with the emergence 
of the hermeneutic project, what also arises is a capacity to transform the 
way the attribution of meaning occurs. As will be suggested the latter needs 
to be understood as the move from allegory to allegoresis. Allegoresis is the 
process that allows for the continuity of allegorization and thus a distancing 
of the opposition between the allegorical and the literal as that which 
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delimits the setting of interpretation.  Even though the conventional move 
between the literal and the allegorical elements continue to intersect 
within Philo’s writings as a whole, specific emphasis here is to be given to 
his text On The Migration of Abraham. While it may be the case that in 
Philo allegorical interpretation becomes literalized in the process of 
meaning’s attribution, such that the allegorical assumes a singular 
determination, what is inaugurated by the hermeneutic, understood here as 
integral to the move from the allegorical to allegoresis, when taken in 
conjunction with what might be considered as its preconditions, cannot be 
constrained by that possibility.3 There are at least two reasons why this is 
the case. Firstly, it is due to the nature of the interconnection between the 
ethical and the hermeneutic and the implicit philosophical anthropology 
within that connection. The term ‘philosophical anthropology’ designates 
here the thinking of the being of being human that pluralizes any 
conception of propriety.4 Hence what is at stake is how here in the context 
of Philo’s writings the being of being human is thought.  
 The second element orientating this project stems from the argument 
that any attempted reintroduction of the literal, that reintroduction that 
would occur if the allegorical is literalized, will founder if the new sense of 
the literal is taken as an ‘end’ that closes the interpretive project. The 
impossibility of holding to the literal as an end and therefore as the singular 
end - occurs for a specific reason. Namely, the hermeneutic exercise, now 
understood in terms of the move from allegory to allegoresis, allows for the 
recovery of interpretive possibilities that are not held within the text’s (or 
indeed any text’s) own formulation of the literal/allegorical distinction. 
Openings are therefore maintained. In addition, the literal is retained. The 
words as they appear on the page, or indeed words as they are ‘heard’, 
continue in place. Bodies have an enduring presence. The literal perdures. 
Nonetheless, the response to the insistence of the literal has to be the same 
in every instance. The literal, whether it is taken as original or as a posited 
result, inevitably opens beyond itself. This is the movement of allegoresis. 
The key point here is that maintaining the literal does not entail that it is 
maintained as end in itself. The literal once incorporated within the 
hermeneutic sustains, by definition, its own capacity to open beyond itself. 
As a result the literal present within its own rearticulation becomes a 
possibility that, in the end, cannot be attributed any direct priority.  
    ***************** 
 A lunette dating from the mid 12th century and which once decorated 
the Chiesa di San Giusto in Volterra had a relatively straightforward project. 
(Figure 1) Demons devour a sinner. Necks, head and genitals are attacked. 
The sense of attack is both clear and overwhelming. Images of this kind 
continue to occur within medieval art, in psalters and perhaps as 
significantly as part of the ‘decoration’ on churches. They were viewed. 
They were objects of sight. They were not read. The force of such images, 
the image as that which is seen, is clear. It is an image of the future. It is an 
image displayed ‘now’ which is, at the same time, an image of the future. 
The space between any now and the future is effaced by the presence of 
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this image. The lunette aspires therefore to pure immediacy. (This 
aspirational quality is itself essential.) The formulation ‘pure immediacy’ 
has a specific meaning in this context. It is the attempt which, while 
conceding the presence of contingency and thus the structure of the 
decision, works to efface the possibility of contingency and thus a 
contestable decision, by the presentation of that which resists negotiation; 
hence the power of an already present and thus non-negotiable image of 
the future. (The lunette is clear; ‘This is what it will be like!’) Immediacy 
would have overturned the already present status of mediacy. On the other 
hand, however, holding to the originality of the contestable decision, its 
already present status, means that the temporality of the present – the time 
of possibility – contains an openness whose elimination occurs through and 
as a result of fear. The counter to which is that the present as a locus of 
both conflict and the decision entails a different but nonetheless specific 
conception of the interplay of time and occurrence. Within such a 
conception the temporality of the present is always charged with 
possibilities. Responsibility becomes the ordered response to such a set up. 
The assumption here is that this pure immediacy, as staged by the lunette, 
is that which attempts to strip the temporality of the present of that 
already present complexity that demands both the decision and 
responsibility. For this attempt to be effective, fear must overwhelm the 
present. The undertaking in question therefore has to rid the present both 
of contingency and the possibility of a decision.5  
 To make the claim specific; the project of the lunette is to instil fear. 
Fear is that which resists negotiation within the terms in which the need for 
the decision as well as a locus of possibility are themselves present. 
Resisting fear involves therefore the construction of a barrier to fear’s 
immediacy.6 The barrier is a space, more accurately a spacing. (Spacing as 
the locus of actual and potential activity.) As a result there cannot be a 
counter image. If fear operates by closing down the space between the ‘now’ 
and the future such that the now seen future determines immediately life in 
the now, then the question that emerges concerns the status of the barrier. 
The barrier cannot be literalized. It occurs therefore beyond the hold of the 
image. The barrier becomes the reintroduction, perhaps the affirmation of 
the temporality of that version of the present that resists pure immediacy 
and thus which continues to stage openings such that the barrier is the 
opening itself. One name for that resistance and thus one possibility to 
present that which is committed to resisting the claim that pure immediacy, 
understood as the identification of the literal with the real and thus the 
construction of an exclusive and excluding present, is the hermeneutic. The 
latter is premised both on the refusal of immediacy and thus on the 
inscription into the real of that which continues to open and thus define the 
real as a space of encounter, and thus more importantly, as a space of 
contingent action.7 (Indeed part of the argument to come is that the 
hermeneutic once defined in relation to the process of continual 
allegorisation (i.e. allegoresis) functions as such a barrier in the precise 
sense that it opens the space of the decision.) Pure immediacy accepts that 
action is contingent.  As a direct result fear becomes the attempt to close 
down the space between the now and the future. The project of the 
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instilling of fear is to overcome that conception of the future as one that is 
to be made and therefore which would be a future whose possibilities are 
always yet to have a determining image. Fear is that which reinforces the 
repetition of the Same, i.e. fated existence, by exerting a dominating hold 
on the image of the future. As a result what then happens is that the 
future’s  yet-to-be quality is the object of effacement.  
 There is a reversal of his position that is given within the precise 
same frame of reference. In other words, there is another position that 
occurs within a set up structured by the relationship between sight and fear. 
As certainly as there is a necessity for fear because of the immediacy of 
what is present, and the attendant certainty of an image that is without 
need of interpretation (or this is at the very least the image’s projected 
force) and therefore which is also a form of pure immediacy, there is 
another modality of seeing whose force resides in the possibility of undoing 
the hold of fear. However, what is significant is that this occurs without 
that form of openness that is attended by responsibility. As a result it is not 
a barrier. It is simply fear’s other side; and thus another structure of 
projected immediacy. This other seeing, and it is essential that what occurs 
is defined in terms of the temporality of seeing as an immediate act, is 
evident in Plato. The reference to Plato is important in this context 
precisely because of the significance of the link between Plato and Philo.  
 In the Phaedo, at a certain point in his exchange with Cebes, Socrates 
identifies one of the important components of the philosopher’s soul. Of the 
range of defining elements the most significant in this context is the way 
the soul is disposed such that it is able to release itself from the hold of a 
specific conception of repetition. The continuity of the body’s concerns 
which are unending, or rather which have their ‘end’ in both senses of the 
term in the bodies own ‘ends’, are linked to the continuity of Penelope and 
the weaving and then the undoing of the woven robe. Penelope names the 
structure of deliberate repetition. The philosopher’s soul undoes this form 
of repetition; a repetition which in the context of the Phaedo is structured 
by the continuity of the body’s own needs and ends. The interruption is 
occasioned by a shift in the form that looking takes on. It is essential that 
what occurs does so as the result of the presence of another modality of 
seeing. The visual provides the way ahead. Socrates sums up the position of 
the philosophical soul in the following terms;  
 No, his soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, 
must  follow reason and abide always in it, beholding (θεωμενη) that which 
is true  and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its 
only food; and in  this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and 
then at death pass on  to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, 
and be free from human ills.  A soul which has been nurtured in this way, 
Simmias and Cebes, is not  likely to fear (μη φοβηθη) that it will be torn 
asunder at its departure from  the body and will vanish into nothingness, 
blown apart by the winds, and be  no longer anywhere.8 84a-b 
The overcoming of ‘fear’ (φοβος), here the fear that occurs with death, 
depends therefore upon a form of seeing, i.e. the immediacy of viewing. 
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The act of seeing has a transformative effect.  Here, there is the counter 
positioning of pure immediacy by another conception of pure immediacy. 
There is another seeing, one whose immediacy, and its being immediate has 
an ineliminable necessity, is projected to dispel fear. Fear’s opposite, what 
op-poses fear, in this context, is simply another form of pure immediacy. 
The other seeing is not a barrier to fear, it is simply there in op-position. 
The reinforcing of that which occurs with pure immediacy involves 
grounding the regulative within it. Again the structure of the contestable 
decision would have been obviated because once the regulative is ground in 
pure immediacy then the absence of contestability entails the move from 
power – where the latter is that which enable law to be operative – to 
violence. Power stands against violence.9 The barrier stands against violence. 
And yet, of course, violence is that which can overthrow it. The barrier 
therefore, the space opened by then contestable decision, the place in 
which an interpretation that refused either the literal or the literalization 
of the allegorical and thus where allegoresis would emerge in the place of 
mere allegory, became a stand: standing, being, against violence. As such, 
it is violence’s counter-measure. Allegoresis is the continual possibility of 
allegorization. As indicated it is the potential of allegorization (even of 
allegory) that cannot be close. What matters here however is the way this 
possibility arises in Philo’s texts.  
 The triumph over fear as a form of pure immediacy is evident in one 
of frescoes by Andrea di Bonaiuto in La Chiesa degli Spagnoli in Florence. 
(Figure 2) The triumphant Christ greets the believers (‘the brethren’) having 
triumphed over the demons. One of the latter lies crushed beneath a door. 
The joined hands and the visual exchange, occurring in the now of its 
happening, emptying that now of the possibility of its being other, such that 
what appears is immediate completion. Taken together the lunette and the 
fresco are two differing modalities of pure immediacy. If it is possible to 
take up what can be called the counter-measure, specifically here the 
counter-measure to fear, then it cannot be positioned in terms of seeing 
when the latter is defined in terms of pure immediacy. In other words, 
there is no counter-measure in the affirming and negating of fear defined by 
the centrality of the eye if the latter is taken to act immediately. Rather, 
the argument is that the presence of a counter-measure has to be located in 
the suspension of that opposition. The argument to be advanced here is that 
not only does the hermeneutic take the form of a counter-measure, such a 
position can be recovered from Philo’s conception of allegory opens towards 
the ineliminabiity of allegoresis. What that means is that it is recovered 
from what is already is at work within what allows for the interpretation of 
text and thus what is generated by the text’s own interpretation. While the 
language of sight will be given centrality in Philo, the important point is 
that it is not sight as pure immediacy. On the contrary, it is a deliberative 
sense of sight. It is a form of seeing in which, in overcoming the immediacy 
of the literal, seeing takes on the quality of a deliberative decision. 
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(Figure 2. Andrea di Bonaiuto. Detail from La Chiesa degli Spagnoli in 
Florence) 
 
Perhaps it should not be thought surprising that there was an attempt within 
Philo’s thought that while recognizing the hold of fear seeks to displace it. 
What counters ‘fear’ is ‘hope’. Hope, however, is there as an expectation 
and thus as an opening to the future. Hope cannot be separated from the 
hermeneutic. Hope is another name for the barrier to fear. 
 Holy, too, and praiseworthy is the hopeful man, just as on the 
contrary the  despondent is unholy and blameworthy, since in all things he 
takes fear  (φόβω) for his evil counsellor; for no two things are more at 
enmity with  each other, men say, than fear (φόβον) and hope (ἐλπίδα), and 
surely that is  natural, for each is an expectation, hope of good, fear 
on the other hand of  evil, and their natures are irreconcilable and 
incapable of agreement.10 
      ***************** 
 In On the Migration of Abraham there is an important evocation of 
seeing.11 The affinity with Plato is fundamental. Nonetheless, and as has 
been intimated, it is the nature of its differentiation from the Platonic that 
opens up what might be described as the particularity of what the Philovian 
hermeneutic project allows. That this project betrays a certain fragility has, 
as will be suggested, an already present inevitability. It is inherent in the 
move from immediacy to mediacy. Philo writes the following: 
 If the senses are a hindrance to the exact sight (την ακριβη θεαν) of 
the  spiritual object (του νοητου), those who find happiness in beholding 
 (φιλοθεαμοσι) are at pains to crush their attack; they shut their eyes 
 (ομμας) and stop their ears,  and check the impulse bred by the 
other senses,  and deem it well to spend their days in solitude and 
darkness, that no  object of sense percept may dim the eye of the soul (το 
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φυχης ομμα), to  which God has given the power of sight (βλεπειν) to see 
things spiritual  (νοητα).12 
It is essential to be clear here. This passage emerges just after a discussion 
of ‘sleep’ in which it suggested that during that period it becomes possible 
see into the future. While such a possibility is important, it is not central to 
the development of the position that leads to the seeing of ‘things spiritual’ 
(νοητα) except to the extent that there is a link between dreaming and 
withdrawal. The importance aspect of solitude as noted above is its 
deliberate and thus its intentional nature. Deliberation understood as a 
form of activity has to allow for the introduction of the question as to how 
it becomes possible to turn from ‘the mental pictures presented by the 
senses’ (τας αισθηεσις φαντασιων) and then to move towards the possibility 
of an engagement with ‘things spiritual’ (νοητα). The move is not 
immediate. There has to be an intervening step. The question to be 
addressed therefore concerns how this is possible. For Plato such an 
engagement involves a form of ‘recollection’ (αναμνησις). Indeed, again in 
the Phaedo, though the position is also argued in the Meno (e.g. 85d6-7), 
Socrates makes an emphatic claim in this regard, ‘our learning is nothing 
else than recollection’ (ημιν η μαθησις ουκ αλλο τι η αναμνησις).13 While 
there is a similarity of structure since there is an obvious affinity between 
the objects of engagement, the approach in Philo is fundamentally different. 
For Plato what is essential to the activity of the soul is that it moves, ‘into 
the realm of the pure, the always the same as itself, the immortal and the 
changeless’ (εις το καθαρον τε και αει ον και αθανατοιν και ωσαθτως).14 The 
argument in general terms is that any comparable sense of movement for 
Philo, the movement into domains of this nature, is fundamentally different. 
That movement is nothing other than interpretation and thus the project of 
allegory. (Hence it is emphatically not a form of ‘recollection’.) If there is 
access to the domain that the soul holds open then it occurs via an 
engagement with text. It does not occur as a result of seeing in any direct 
sense. And this is the case even if the end point is a return to the privileging 
of sight. As such at work here is the mediate, in the precise sense that, at 
its inception, this engagement is mediated in advance by the text, rather 
than the immediate. For Philo a transformation of the given occurs through 
an act of reading. While reading may not be thematised as such, it is 
precisely the ineliminability of the act that causes Philo’s texts to open up 
beyond themselves. The move from seeing to reading can never be bought 
to an end by a simple return to seeing and thus to the posited singularity of 
insight (in other words to the immediate as though it had simply displaced 
the process of mediation and were able to return as anything other than a 
pragmatic determination). The inevitability of the move from seeing to 
reading announces the move from allegory – where the latter is defined in 
terms of its opposition to the literal – to allegoresis.15 The significant point 
is therefore that the move to the allegorical becomes itself an allegory 
whose own differential repetition occurs, thus its discontinuous continuity is 
staged, every time mediacy takes precedence over immediacy in the guise 
of finality. The return of the immediate, were it to be assumed to have 
occurred, or were it merely to be posited, is therefore the return to a 
structure in which fear predominates (and ensuing enforcement of the set 
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up it envisages necessitated). As will continue to be argued, the 
hermeneutic becomes the barrier to that possibility. This reconfiguration of 
the hermeneutic opens a different legislative procedure.  
 On the Migration of Abraham begins with an engagement with the 
opening line of Genesis XII. 1-4: ’Depart out of the land, out of thy kindred 
and out of thy father’s land’.16 Each of these elements is read allegorically 
insofar as what takes precedence is the symbolic register of each term. The 
presupposition being that none of these terms can be equated purely with 
their literal meaning. In others words, while immediacy is a possibility, it 
simply closes the space of meaning, and as such fails to let the meaning 
appear. As such what has to appear in its place is the other possibility that 
will always have been there and thus its actualization, which is, of course, 
the actualization of a potentiality, has to do with the status of the object; 
here what this means is the status of the word. And in the case of Philo 
what this entails is a transformed sense of ‘word’. The project of Philo’s 
own texts therefore is a recovery, from the initial set of meanings, of that 
other possibility. (The move beyond the opposition allegorical/literal is 
already gestured at here since the question that while suspended though 
which is nonetheless real is the extent that Philo’s texts themselves allow 
themselves to be approached in exactly this way.) The identification of 
forms of recovery is not just an interpretive claim. That recovery, in the 
context of Philo’s own writings, has the effect both of orientating behavior 
and allowing for the disclosure, at the same time, of that which is essential 
to human being. In other words, it is the move to the allegorical that allows 
for an interconnection between the ethical and a philosophical anthropology 
to be made clear. Wisdom is a component of human being. It is the activity 
that mediates the relation between text and meaning. Equally, again as a 
mediating act, it allows the text recast as the ‘word’ and thus recast as a 
form of nomos, to function as regulative. Part of the overall argument 
therefore is that ‘wisdom’ names a form of mediation. Wisdom, precisely 
because of its indispensible role in the hermeneutic, is integral to the 
construction of the barrier. Rather than try and trace the argumentation of 
the text as a whole, centrality will be attributed to a number of moments 
that indicates both the necessity of the hermeneutic thus construed 
including its link to a philosophical anthropology and also the way that any 
attempt  to close the spaces of mediation, while real, also comes undone in 
the work of the text itself. 
 As noted above each of these terms - the land, kindred and father’s 
land, is given a symbolic register. To take one: ‘Land’ is a symbol of the 
‘body’. Leaving the ‘land’ becomes the project. The line has to be 
understood. There is an interpretative exigency which, in this context has to 
begin with the recognition that the line in question occurs within a text and 
therefore the question of interpretation stems from an understanding of the 
text itself since it provides that in terms of which the text is itself to be 
understood. When the symbolic register is given priority over the literal a 
different of human being emerges. The identification of human being with 
the body’s literal presence is displaced. Another conception of human being 
emerges with the move from the literal and therefore a different 
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philosophical anthropology is in play. Overcoming that position, i.e. 
overcoming that initial identification, allows for another form of 
identification.  Namely, an identification that is of course only ever present 
as a contingent possibility. The additional point that contingency is itself 
present, as a necessity, also needs to be made. Its necessity is ground in its 
being a necessary possibility. Its contingency is located in the non-necessity 
of the identification of the being of being human with ‘virtue’. A more 
general point can be made here, one that is opened up by a connection 
between the interpretive and the ethical where the ethical is defined in 
relation to decisions that are an inherent part of human life. The point is 
straightforward. The ethical inheres in life. It is a possibility that comes to 
be experienced as such. The ethical and thus a thinking of the good life 
come to the subject in terms of a form of recognition. Hence the ethical 
cannot be separated from the subject’s own experiences of the world. As a 
result the ethical, in terms of the choice of ‘virtue’ is always contingent 
precisely because its opposite – ‘vice’ - can never precluded. Vice remains a 
decision. Note that in On the Preliminary Studies, Philo argues that with 
development and maturity, 
 there springs from a single root the twofold stalk, virtue and vice 
(αρετη  και  κακια) and we form an apprehension of both, but 
necessarily chose one  or  the other, the better natured (ευφυεις) 
choosing virtue, the opposite kind  vice.17 
There is always a twofold possibility. Fear is the attempt to close it down. 
Where the closure is immediate. The project of the immediate is that the 
processes, tied to training, and in which decisions are made, are rendered 
inoperative. Here, with this account of virtue, there is another possibility. 
Virtue is now present as a potentiality (dependent both upon a sense of 
movement that is itself dependent upon a specific reading or interpretation 
of the text). In other words, coming to be aware of virtue occurs as a result 
of reading and thus the process of interpretation. Involved here therefore is 
a form of transformation, which, in this exact context, is the movement to 
another sense of ‘land’. Coming to ‘virtue’ is a result a form ‘migration’. Of 
this movement Philo writes, in a complex and demanding passage: 
 ..thou must change thine abode and betake thee to thy father’s land, 
the land  of the word that is holy (την πατρων γην την ιεπου λογου) and 
in some sense  father of thοse that admit to training (ασκητων): and 
that land is wisdom  (σοφια), abode most choice of virtue loving souls 
(των φιλαρετων ψθχων).18 
What is opened up here is the need to begin to understand the sense of 
recognition or insight that is both afforded and demanded by such a passage. 
If there is a way of concentrating the issues at stake within it, then it is 
clear that they emerge from how the complex of relations between 
‘reading’, ‘insight’ and ‘hearing’ are to be understood. It is essential to 
remember that terms ‘hearing’ and ‘seeing’ have both literal as well as non-
literal determinations. (Again the unasked though essential questions are 
the following: how are these two forms of presence to be understood: How 
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is their relationship formulated?) It should be clear from the start that what 
is at stake is the relationship between ‘reading’ and ‘insight’.  
 The way in is to approach that relationship as part of a net work of 
relations which, in general terms, brings considerations of understanding 
into play and in which what it means to understand (and of course to act on 
that understanding) has to allow for the copresence of the literal and the 
symbolic. In other words, again in general terms, the process of 
understanding is only ever allegorical. (Hence the question of what it means 
to ascribe any form of literal finality to understanding.) Understanding, as 
present here, is the realization and opening of the hermeneutic process. 
And significantly, it is the only understanding that is linked to ‘virtue loving 
souls’. The distinction between ‘seeing’ and ‘reading’ is equally as 
fundamental. In regards to that relation, Philo cites Genesis IX. 31. ‘God 
saw (ειδεν) all than he had made’. However Philo is quick to draw a 
distinction between ‘seeing and ‘insight’ (ειδησιν). The work of language 
here is essential. Seeing cannot be reduced therefore to its literal presence. 
Seeing cannot be mere seeing. Seeing is not immediate. As a result what 
this means is that is that the complexity of seeing entails that all 
subsequent invocations of seeing will have been complicated in advance by 
the force of the distinction between ‘seeing and ‘insight’. The distinction 
between them plays a fundamental role in the way that Philo contrasts and 
then separates ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing in sections 47-50. Hence the detail is 
worth pursuing. 
 This section of the text  - sections 47-50 – is structured by an 
engagement with two particular lines from Exodus. In both instances the 
literal claim is clear. The first line is: ‘all (πας) the people saw the voice’ 
(Exodus XX. 18) and then, ‘You have seen that I spoke to you out of heaven’. 
(Exodus XX.22). In both instance a voice was seen not heard. To argue that a 
voice is seen, were this to be taken as a straightforward assertion, is to 
make a claim that is false. Voices are not seen. How then are the lines to be 
understood? The possibility of meaning is ground in the impossibility of the 
literal. Therefore what sustains interpretation is the recognition that as a 
claim its truth does not reside in the line’s literal content. What occasions 
the process of recovery is that what the line also announces is the presence 
of divisions within modes of seeing. There is both the literal act, the bodily 
eye that sees, and then the soul’s seeing. In Philo’s terms what the lines of 
text indicate is that: ‘the words of God are interpreted by the power of 
sight residing in the soul’.19 This is the mode of interpretation that the 
words demand, and it is essential to note that they are words of text. Hence 
what is at work from the start is the mediated process of reading. (Moreover, 
it is terms of the processes’ ineliminability that allegory yields the move to 
allegoresis.) In this instance what the soul ‘sees’ is that which is to be 
distinguished from the categorization of the object that occurs with literal 
hearing (or indeed literal seeing). Now, while there is an unequivocal return 
to sight that return works, at the same time, to hold literal sight at a 
necessary distance from the sight of the soul. Indeed, the argument 
depends upon this possibility. Insisting on the distancing of the literal is not 
to eschew the possibility of virtue. Virtue is only impossible if the literal is 
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taken as an end itself. The suspension of immediacy occasions virtue. 
Recognizing of course that the move to virtue is itself the result of a 
decision the result of which could have been otherwise. ‘Vice’ remains a 
continual possibility.  
 Here it is worth pausing and noting that there are two paths that can 
be pursued at this point. The first is stay within the exact confines of the 
text and suggest that what is at work here has to be limited to 
investigations with an emergent Neo-Platonic universe. While such an 
undertaking has its own significance, it limits the allegorical to the content 
of the text and fails to allow for the allegorical to register allegorically, i.e. 
it fails to allow for the move from allegory to allegoresis. Hence, the second 
path involves a return to what has already been noted as at work in Philo 
namely the link between interpretation, the development of a philosophical 
anthropology and the ethical. (The latter announced specifically in the text 
in the various forms of reference to virtue and wisdom.) To insist on the link 
between the interpretive, a philosophical anthropology and the ethical 
opens the text by not allowing it to be equated with its position within a 
historical framework – which is of course also to allow for that possibility to 
be maintained without its being determining in the last instance – is to allow 
for the retention of the force of the allegorical. That force involves the 
move from the presence of allegory to the continuity of the latter’s opening 
through the impossibility of constraining the potentiality inherent in the 
process of allegoresis.   
    ******************* 
 
 In order to take these considerations a stage further it is essential to 
stay with the detail of the text. At a later stage – indeed at 127 – Philo 
begins with the interpretation of Genesis XII.4 – ‘Abraham journeyed even as 
the Lord spoke him’. Two elements are clear even from the most 
elementary engagement with the line. It is both the case that Abraham is 
travelling, and that God is speaking to him. This line is of course cited just 
after Philo has shown that virtue (αρετη) emerges in the process of its 
having been recovered. That recovery occurs within a particular setting. 
There is the preceding argument that ‘virtue’, while an attendant possibility, 
has to be recovered. Thus its presence is always contingent. (It need not 
have been recovered since the path to ‘vice’ (κακια) remains an always 
present possibility.) What is of particular interest is the way that recovery is 
understood and explained by the text. Philo refers to the passage of time 
that is marked by the seasons. Virtue, its recovery, it can be argued occurs 
as ‘season’ that interrupts this passage. Hence Sarah gives birth within a 
season that is not determined in advance, Rather she gave birth within a 
season that ‘time does not determine.’20 The latter is the ‘achronic’ that 
interrupts the flow of chronos. Part of the argument to come is that the 
achronic as a figure of interruption can be repositioned as the barrier to 
fear precisely because the achronic is that which stems and interrupts the 
repetition of the always the same. It sustains an opening, and yet it does 
not provide a counter image. The achronic names a productive caesura.  
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 This interruption of time, and thus the return to the way of God, is 
neither a chance event, nor a mere event. It occurs as a result of Sarah’s 
‘wisdom’. She is ‘wise’. Philo is explicit.  Sarah is η φρονησις. There is 
therefore an important relationship between time and wisdom. The latter 
allows for that shift in time in which virtue emerges. While this point is just 
noted as if it occurred in passing, it is precisely this conception of birth that 
already functions as an allegory. It becomes a way of thinking the Messianic. 
It is an allegorical presentation of that position. It has a less emphatic form 
in the argument that the affirmation of virtue – remembering that virtue is 
the result of a specific decision that is itself bound up with a specific form 
of recognition, and thus allows itself to be understood as that complex form 
of affirmation in which while there is the acknowledgment of the bodily 
nature of human being, a nature that is there in the move from ‘the dust of 
the ground’ (adamah) to a ‘person’ (adam), it is also the case that the 
presence of a founding irreducibility in which the material is co-present 
with the immaterial, means that the human becomes what it is in the 
process of the continuity of its negotiation with the unconditioned.21 It is 
the presence of the unconditioned, which appears in the opening of the text 
in terms of the ‘soul’, incorporates its other within itself. The ‘irrational’ is 
there with the ‘rational’, ‘sense-perception’ is there with the understanding. 
This originally doubled point of departure is the copresence of the body and 
the soul as a form of anoriginal relation, but which allows, nonetheless, for 
a conception of seeing which is the soul’s. The anoriginal is difference at 
the origin. It pertains to what is. As such, it locates and names a sense of 
irreducibility that is ontological in nature. Here the presence of that which 
is anoriginal allows the soul perceives this doubled presence and chooses its 
own path. The soul therefore becomes the site of a form of anoriginal 
mediation.22  Namley, the presence of a division, and thus a relation, that 
pertains originally. 
 
 This is the position that is reiterated here. In terms of the use of time 
located in Philo’s recasting of the story of Sarah giving birth, there is an 
affirmation of human being that allows both for the recognition of human 
being’s own materiality – its bodily presence – but that the ethical (here 
located in the reiteration of the various forms of ‘virtue’) is located in a 
birth which when read as an allegory becomes the articulation of what 
might be described as the temporality of the Messianic. This is the case 
precisely because the Messianic involves a conception of time as that which 
is interrupted. If chronos is continuity then the Messianic, as a figure of 
thought, is inherently achronic. Hence within the allegory there is 
another allegory. There is a ‘weakened’ sense of the Messianic that is 
operative in every virtuous act that occurs as a result of wisdom precisely 
because it always could have been otherwise.23 (As was suggested at the 
outset this is the possibility that insists within allegory once freed from the 
hold of its definition as the literal’s other.) The explicit contains the 
implicit. In other words, it is only if the second path noted above is allowed 
does this other possibility emerge. There are important consequences of this 
reposition of allegory. Allegory is opening towards allegoresis. The latter as 
the actualization of a potentiality that was always inherent in the 
interdependent relation between the literal and the allegorical.   
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 This is the setting in which the line, ‘Abraham journeyed even as the 
Lord spoke him’ needs to be understood. What is carried over is a still to be 
determined sense of doubled register or twofold possibility; a presence that 
showed itself in the above in terms of time. The ‘telos’ here, and it is one 
that is agreed to, for Philo, by both philosophy (the philosophers) and Moses, 
is for life to follow ‘nature’.24 The question is what does ‘nature’ (φυσις) 
mean here? Philo, in responding to such a question, draws an important 
interconnection between ‘nature’, ‘virtue’ and ‘reason’.  Nature is not 
opposed to them. Indeed, it is possible to go further and argue that their 
interconnection is the definition of ‘nature’. ‘Nature’ does not stand on the 
outside. Life – and note that it is a life that would be there in its being lived 
and as such this is not a claim about biological life but what life can be for a 
human being - occurs for Philo, when,  
 the mind (ο νους) having entered on virtue’s path (την αρετης 
ατραπον),  walks in the track of right reason (ορθου λογου) and follows 
God.25 
There is an important accord between what is identified here as ‘right 
reason’ as descriptive of nature in the first instance and then, in the second, 
the human response to ‘right reason’. Again, ‘nature’ is not an outside. 
Rather, ‘nature;, as the term is present here is equally a locus of ‘right 
reason’. And yet the difference between human being which has been 
accounted for in tis context in terms of the emergent philosophical 
anthropology that is beginning to insist, and ‘nature’ has to occur at this 
precise moment. Following God, remembering that God will be of greater 
significance than either reason or nomos insofar as God created the ‘law’, 
necessitates a decision. Following God is that which occurs as a result 
of  ‘right reason’, which can itself be understood as reason’s recognition of 
the compelling nature of law and which is also to argue that it is a practice 
marked by the inevitability of contingency. (Deliberation is linked to reason). 
As has already been suggested contingency emerges since the necessity that 
attends ‘law’, precisely because, to follow the text closely, the ‘law’ is the 
'divine word’, and yet this description of the ‘law’ does not entail that ‘all’ 
will follow its path. While there cannot be an easy separation between ‘law’ 
and ‘word’, there has to be a space of contingency. It is that necessity 
of contingency that allows for both the discussion of God’s word and the 
introduction of the term ‘allegory’ in section 131. Indeed, turning to section 
131 allows for a clarification of the implicit structure of allegory within the 
text, noted above in terms of the presence of a messianic structure within 
the treatment of Sarah. The remains an important link between the 
messianic and natality insofar as the Messianic as a structure has a strong 
emphatic form, though it has a ‘weakened’ form in which the interruption 
of fate, in sum the affirmation of virtue, gestures towards the emphatic.26 
However prior to a direct engagement with section 131 the use of the 
formulation ‘right reason’ needs to be pursued. 
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 There are many instance of the term in Plato - e.g.  Phaedo (73a9-10). 
However there are complications within Plato in terms of mapping his 
version on to Philo. This might be true despite the fact that 
the connection between Philo and Plato is demonstrable on many levels. 
Equally the formulation places a decisive role in Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics. In that text, at 6.13.Aristotle advances the argument that not only is 
there is a link between right reason and virtue, it is also the case that 
virtue demands the use of ‘right reason’.27 Philo is not Aristotle. However, a 
few lines later, at 134 - in what could be a blend of two Aristotelian terms 
Philo wrote of του φρονειν ορθος the telos of which becomes nothing less 
than the affirmation of human finitude in relation to God. Reason and 
wisdom understood in terms that are always mediated by the necessity 
that their use be correct work together to open up a sense of open of 
calculation that is linked to the need to interpret. The unavailability of 
correct action as a given, mirrors the drive to allegory insofar as both 
involve deliberation and contingency.  
 
 The evocation of ‘allegory’ to which a turn will be made here occurs 
in the context of a discussion of ‘law’ (νομος). Wisdom involves activity that 
occurs in relation to the law. For Philo, ‘God’s words are the activities of 
the wise person’. (τους του θεου λογος πραξεις ειναι του σοφου).28 What is 
opened up here is the general question of the relation to the law. Hence the 
question: What does it mean to live in relation to the law? Answering that 
question necessitates understanding that the ‘law’ is not an abstract or 
general proposition. Law is linked to the word and thus to the activity of 
interpretation. As a result, in order to open up a way to understand the 
import of the link between ‘action’ and law, Philo cites a line from Torah, 
specifically, Deuteronomy X.20: i.e. ‘thou shalt go in the steps of the Lord 
they God’. In relation to this line he then adds that the response to it 
cannot be structured by its literal force. Rather, what the line states 
involves the recognition that it is an allegorical formulation concerning the 
soul’s acting in relation to ‘divine ordinances’ (θεια δογματα). Philo’s 
analysis of both language and levels of response to the text then continues. 
Nonetheless what is fundamental is that the line’s meaning is only available 
in terms of its presence as allegory, the allegorical is itself the condition in 
terms of which it is possible to act in relation to the law. That action 
however is not immediate. There are two interrelated senses of mediacy at 
work here. The first is that the move from the literal to the allegorical is 
already a form of mediation. The second is that the nature of the 
connection between activity that has a determining relation to the law and 
the law as the ‘word’ is thought by Philo is terms of ‘wisdom’. Wisdom 
names a relation to the law that is always already mediated. Wisdom names 
therefore what has already been identified as the ‘barrier’ to fear. Wisdom 
stands against immediacy. Following the law therefore is not the immediate 
response to the literal. Rather, it is the always already mediated response 
that wisdom affords. Following the law therefore, and here following needs 
to be understood as going ‘in the steps of’ is the possibility, and it is an 
interpretive possibility, that depends upon the allegorical and as a result 
the opening of the hermeneutic.   
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 There is a complex play of terms, ‘allegory’, ‘wisdom’, ‘law’, ‘word’, 
‘understanding’, etc. While it would be possible to give a definition of each 
it is clear from what has been argued thus far that they are interconnected 
in significant and important ways. What marks that interconnection, 
perhaps what defines it, is that what are staged are modes of activity. The 
word (incorporating nomos) and praxis can only be separated because the 
connection is contingent. What connects then – i.e. wisdom – entails that 
‘vice’ while possible can be distanced in the name of ‘virtue’. This is what 
an engagement with the text involves when its words are not taken as ends 
in themselves. In Sections 22-3 there is an important position advanced by 
Philo in order to secure the strength of the literal and thus the related claim 
that were it to be excluded, and the text read simply figuratively, then the 
overall force of the text itself would have been lost. The passage from On 
The Migration of Abraham is the following: 
 Why, we shall be ignoring the sanctity of the Temple and a thousand 
other  things, if we are going to pay heed to nothing except what is shown 
us by  the inner meaning of things (υπονοιων).29 
The identification of an inner meaning’ has an important ubiquity in Philo. It 
is also used by Xenophon to identify that of which the poets were ignorant. 
In Xenophon’s Symposium Socrates says of the poets that they ‘ did not 
know the inner meaning of the poem’ (τας υπονοιας ουκ επιστανται).30  It is 
important, the argument adduced by Philo runs, to be able to distinguish 
between differing ways in which words are used. The necessity that arises 
here, the necessity to be able to attribute meaning to the literal and thus to 
allow the literal to be linked to a conception of practice that is itself not 
distanced from the concerns of wisdom and the understanding, opens up a 
way of identifying what can be taken as fundamental aspects of Philo's 
hermeneutics once the opposition between the literal and the allegorical is 
itself distanced.  
 If there is a limit to Philo’s interpretive project then rises from the 
fact that as those strategies at work within it develop it becomes clear that 
the allegorical meaning of a line of text becomes its meaning with the 
related consequence that the possible allegorization of allegory – what has 
already been identified by the use of the term allegoresis – has been 
precluded. It is possible to identify the ‘inner meaning’ or the symbolic 
meaning or the meaning that arises once the allegorical is taken as more 
important than the literal. Equally, it is possible to identify the literal as 
itself a locus of meaning. However, the mediation of the loci of meaning by 
wisdom and the understanding has a specific outcome that undoes in 
advance forms of possible finality. What is entailed is that action in relation 
to any locus of meaning is always mediated in advance. There is no pure site 
of meaning in the precise sense that there cannot be a response to that 
which calls on the practice of ‘understanding’ that is itself sustained by 
pure immediacy. This would be a contradictory state of affairs. Pure 
immediacy, moreover, is undone in advance by the intervention of what can 
be described more generally as processes of interpretation which are 
themselves to be understood in terms of potentiality. Hence processes are 
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not relative as though there was simply contestation on the level of meaning. 
The argument is always going to be that mediation becomes that in relation 
to which decisions are both made and contested. Hence, while it is right for 
Philo to argue that the both the literal and the figural, the statement and 
its presence as allegory are essential since both are at work within the 
complex formulations that link wisdom, understanding and action, it is also 
the case that the precise nature of the distinction and the precise 
implications of claims to meaning cannot be either formalized or foreclosed 
in advance. There is a barrier, which is a locus of negotiation. Undoing the 
site of negotiation means that the complex temporality of interruption, the 
productive caesura that is linked to acting with wisdom such that wisdom 
has an interruptive uniqueness to it that allows a connection between virtue 
and the interpretation to be thought, would itself have been circumvented. 
The text opens beyond its own immediate concerns. The hermeneutic 
therefore is not a form of continuity in which there is an unchecked 
proliferation of meaning. Rather, it is a continual opening in which what 
comes to the fore must be subject to processes of interpretation, 
transformation and deliberation and thus it is that within which the 
distinction between the literal and the allegorical is destabilized by the 
process of allegoresis. A process that has already figured - figuring without 
being named as such - as the interruption of chromos itself the figure of 
repetition that birth, in the text Sarah’s giving birth, allows to figure.  
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1 While allegory has an important role in Philo and it is accompanied by a 
systematic refusal of the literal, if the latter is taken as an end in itself, this 
is not a uniquely Judaic interpretive phenomenon. It is also there in, 
amongst others, in Gregory of Nyssa. See in regards to the latter: Ronald E. 
Heine. Gregory of Nyssa's Apology for Allegory. Vigiliae Christianae, Vol. 38, 
No. 4 (Dec., 1984), pp. 360-370. Philo’s interpretation of the Septuagint 
needs to be understood within the context of a deep investigation occurring 
in Alexandria of the practice of interpretation. There is an important link to 
Homer scholarship which is occurring at the same time. In this regard see 
Maren R. Niehoff. Jewish Exegesis and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria, 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2014. 
2 Philo. On Abraham. (Translated by F.H. Colson and G.H. Whitaker) Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge. Pages. (68-69.  
3 I have tried to indicate how this occurs in my Hermeneutics and Judaic 
Thought. In The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics. (edited by Jeff 
Malpas, Hans-Helmuth Gander.) London. 2015. 
4 Important in this regard is one of the descriptions given to Moses. Philo 
writes ‘of the proofs of legislator’s humanity and fellow feeling (της του 
νομοθετου φιλανθρωπιας και κοινωνιας) (Translated by F.H.) Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge. 1968. Page 211. Inscribed therefore in the 
language that Philo is using is an attempt to sketch a relation between 
human being, law and life as a practice. This generates the affective ground 
of shared feeling. In other words, there is already a sustained and 
developed philosophical anthropology in Philo. For a contemporary 
reworking of the relation between the human and the divine in Philo that is 
also concerned with delimiting the specificity of human being see: Anca 
Vasiliu. Penser Dieu. La condition de réciprocité. Noétique et théologie 
rationnelle à partir d’une page de Philon d’Alexandrie. Phantasia. Voulme 1. 
2015. 
5 I have pursued this topic in detail elsewhere. See my Anonymity and Fear: 
The Refusal of Relationaity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in my Towards a 
Relational Ontology. SUNY Press. Albany. 2015. Pages 139-159. 
6 There are a number of formulations of the possibility of locating judgment 
as that which is a barrier to fear; a barrier because it distances the merely 
affective is distanced by that which stands apart from it. One example can 
be located in a fragment from Sophocles. In a line - Fragment 760 - that has 
thus far resisted attribution to any specific play - Sophocles wrote: 
 
 Be confident – You have in me a no greater barrier against this fear. 
 (Θαρσει - μεγας σοι τουδ’ εγω φοβου μοχλος). 
 
(Sophocles. Fragments. (Translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones) Harvard University 
Press. Cambridge. 1996. Page 143.) While the detail cannot be presented it 
can nonetheless still be suggested that there is an important link between 
the ‘barrier’ (μοχλος) to fear and the presence of ‘wisdom’ in the opening 
lines of the final Choral Ode in the Antigone. ‘Wisdom’ is that which 
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occasions the good life and which allows for a pious relation to the Gods. 
The line itself reads: 
 
 Wisdom is provided as the chief part of happiness, (το φροωειν 
ευδαιμονιας)  and our dealings with the gods must be in no way unholy. 
(1347)  
 
If fear undoes the possibility of the ‘good life’ then the counter-measure 
can be located in wisdom. Wisdom’s actualization, its worldly presence, is 
mediacy. Deliberation, time and the presence of contestable decisions stand 
against pure immediacy. This will be the case whether the pure immediacy 
of law is linked to the civil or to the divine.  
7 It should be noted that a critical engagement with the use of sculptures 
and sculptured forms to inculcate specific religious doctrines is also evident 
in a number of Christian writers. See in particular the treatment of this 
topic in Bernard of Clairvaux. Apologia. 1125. For a sustained discussion of 
the effect of monsters and demons within the art of this period see: Thomas 
E. A. Dale. Monsters, Corporeal Deformities, and Phantasms in the Cloister 
of St-Michel-de-Cuxa. The Art Bulletin. Vol. 83, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 402-
436 and Bonnie Noble. “Law and Gospel”: Scripture, Truth, and Pictorial 
Rhetoric. Southeastern College Art Conference Review. 2004, Vol. 14, Issue 
4 
8 References to the Phaedo are to Plato Phaedo. (Translated by Harlond 
North Fowler) Harvard University Press. Cambrudge. 1914. 
9 This is, of course, the argument developed famously by Hannah Arendt. 
See her On Violence. Harcourt Brace Javanovich. New York. 1970. 
10 On Abraham. Page 11. See in relation to this passage the following: 
 
 We may find a proof of this in the way in which it changes with the 
soul's  phases. When the soul feels grief, the eyes are full of anxiety and 
depression.  When on the other hand it feels joy, they smile and rejoice. 
When fear is  supreme, they are full of turbulent confusion, and move and 
quiver and roll  confusedly. On Abraham. Page 77 
 
11 The details of ‘seeing’ and its relation to visio Dei is a genuine 
interpretive question in Philo. The argument here is that ‘seeing’ while 
linked to the vision of God and thus to a conception of mystical and thus 
ecstatic experience is mediated by text and thus involves a relation to 
reading that complicates in advance the possibility of seeing as a purely 
immediate experience. For a detailed argument that interconnects seeing 
and the mystical and which leaves the question of reading to one side see: 
Scott D. Mackie. Seeing God in Philo of Alexandria: Means, Methods, and 
Mysticism.   Journal for the Study of Judaism 43 (2012) 147-179 
12 Philo. On The Migration of Abraham. (Translated by F.H. Colson and G.H. 
Whitaker) Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 1985. Page 243 
13 Phaedo. 72E. See in this regard Max Latona. The Tale is Not My Own (ουκ 
έμος ό μύθος): Myth and Recollection in Plato. APEIRON a journal for 
ancient philosophy and science.  
14 Phaedo. 79D.  
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15 The primacy of seeing cannot be differentiated from the need to hold to 
the ‘legitimacy of religious images’. For a detailed investigation of this 
position within the context of the Italian Counter Reformation see Andrew R. 
Casper. Display and Devotion: Exhibiting Icons and Their Copies in Counter-
Reformation Italy. In Wieste de Boer and Christine Göttler. Religion and the 
Senses in Early Modern Europe. Brill. Leiden. 2013. Page 43-63. Part of the 
significance of the argumentation adduced by Casper in relation to the 
Veronica is that that its substitutability and thus its repetition do not undo 
the centrality of vision and thus do not undo what will be developed here in 
terms of the relationship between vision and immediacy. Immediacy is not 
brought into question by substitution.  
16 The ‘migration’ of Abraham becomes a defining motif in the history of 
philosophy. It could be argued that it complicates the figure if Ulysses. As, 
for example, Levinas has argued the figure Abraham counters the nostalgia 
of Ulysses. See Emmanuel Levinas, ‘La trace de l’autre’ in En découvrant de 
l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. Vrin. Paris. 1967. Pages 187-202.  
17 Philo. On The Preliminary Studies. (Translated by F.H. Colson) Harvard 
University Press. Cambridge. 1985.Page 82. 
18 On The Migration of Abraham. Page 149. 
19 On The Migration of Abraham. Page 161. 
20 On The Migration of Abraham. Page 205. 
21 The source here is of course Genesis 2.8:  
 Then Adonai, God, formed (vayyitzer) a person (adam) from the dust 
of the ground (adamah) and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life 
(nimat  hayyim), so that he became a living being (lenepes hayyah).  
 
22 The term anoriginal has been central to the development of a realational 
ontology and the sense of the ethical it generates. See my: Towards a 
Relational Ontology. SUNY Press. Albany. 2015 and Virtue in Being. Towards 
an Ethics of the Unconditioned. SUNY Press. Albany. 2015 
23 Walter Benjamin uses the formulation of the ‘weak messianic power’ in 
his On the Concept of History. See Walter Benjamin Selected Writings. 
Volume 4. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. Page 390. (SW 4: 390). The 
most judicious discussion of this concept in Benjamin is Sami Kahtib. The 
Messianic Without Messianism. Walter Benjamin's Materialist Theology. In 
Anthropology and Materialism. Volume 1. 2013.  
24 On the general question of the conception of Moses in Philo see, Louis 
Feldman. Philo’s Portrayal of Moses in the Context of Ancient Judaism. 
University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana 2007. 
25 On The Migration of Abraham. Page 149. 
26 The idea of birth as a form of beginning is evident in the work of Hannah 
Arendt. She writes, for example, that, ‘the new beginning inherent in birth 
can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the 
capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting’. The Human 
Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1958. Page 9. It is 
equally possible to argue that the temporal structure of Babylon Talmud 
Sanhedrin 98a allows for a similar position to be argued. The text in 
question concerns the possibility of the Messiah’s arrival. At every moment 
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the question pertain to what ‘listening to the voice’ would be like. This is a 
recognition that every moment contains the possibility for actions that 
accord – as the result of a deliberative decision - with a life that is lived in 
relation to virtue, What the Tractate suggests is the presence of a link 
between the good life and the actions it entails and the more emphatic 
sense of the Messianic.  
27 See in this regard D.P. Dryer. Aristotle’s Conception of the Orthos Logos. 
In The Monist. 66. Januaray. 1983. 
28 On The Migration of Abraham. Page 146. 
29 On The Migration of Abraham. Page 185 
30 Xenophon. Symposium III.6. (Translated by E.C. Marchant, O.J. Todd and 
Revised by Jeffery Henderson.) Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 2013. 
